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Stanley Mosk*
Thank you very much Judge Reinhardt, Dean McLaughlin, Mrs.
Brennan, and members of the panel and friends.
I certainly appreciated discussion of the several characteristics of
Justice Brennan and his influence on the law. No doubt his role in
the modem history of American justices is secure.
Yet, it's undeniable that Justice Brennan was not always right-
that is, right by a majority of a vote of his colleagues. There were
times when it seemed as if he were a romanticist drowning in a sea of
pragmatism. But, let me tell you, in view of the introduction, a true
story that reveals how Justice Brennan, and frankly, I with him, could
be innocently deceived and then apparently reach a dubious conclu-
sion.
As mentioned, we were part of a seven man team selected by
New York University to make a study of British judicial procedure.
We went over to spend two solid weeks in London. And, of course,
you get to know a person pretty well when you are with him morning,
noon, and night, as we were with Justice Brennan. In our study, we
were tremendously impressed with British judges. As perhaps you
know, judges in England seldom, if ever, take a case under submis-
sion. No matter how long the matter runs, they announce their deci-
sion immediately from the bench. We were tremendously impressed
with the ability and caliber of British judges who were able to do that
sort of thing. Justice Brennan, as our Chairman, expressed his admi-
ration, and- members of the panel agreed with him. We expressed
that admiration to our host, who was Lord Denning. However, Lord
Denning said-I'll never forget this-"Well, that creates problems at
times." He said it, of course, with a British accent, which I don't
have. Lord Denning said, "I've got to tell you about a colleague of
mine. He heard a case that went on for several weeks, and argument
by counsel went on for several days." They do have unlimited oral
argument in England. And he said, after-the oral argument, his col-
league immediately announced his decision right from the bench.
Then, as Denning described it, his colleague went back into his
* Justice Stanley Mosk serves on the California Supreme Court and was a
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chambers and his clerk helped him off with his wig and his robe.
Suddenly the judge stopped, he shook his head and he slapped his
side. He said, "There I go... I did it again. I said 'plaintiff' when I
meant 'defendant."' So, Justice Brennan and the other members of
our group decided then and there that perhaps our more contempla-
tive method in this country has something to commend it.
My next occasion with Justice Brennan came when I went back
to Washington as Attorney General of California to argue a case be-
fore the U.S. Supreme Court, the case of Arizona v. California,1 in-
volving water from the Colorado River. I must, with due immodesty,
confess that I thought I gave a peroration perhaps the best since Pat-
rick Henry when I said, "The real issue in this case is whether water is
to be used for people in California or for asparagus in Arizona."
Well, I sat down after that great oration, and there was a tap on my
shoulder, a bailiff handed me a note from Justice Brennan. It said,
"Stanley, are you free this evening? Will you come over to the house
for dinner?" Well, I gladly accepted, although I wondered what
would have happened if somebody from Arizona had seen me going
into Justice Brennan's home. During the course of the dinner, I was
very circumspect: I didn't even ask for a glass of water. Ultimately,
it seems the justices preferred asparagus because we lost that case
eight to one.
Nothing we say here today can possibly add much to the knowl-
edge of or the contribution of Justice Brennan to American justice.
In his thirty-four years on the Supreme Court, he made an indelible
impression in many ways, in many areas-civil liberties, race rela-
tions, family relations, privacy rights, religion, race, poverty, politics,
equal participation in a democracy-just to mention a few concepts
to which he made a significant contribution. Controversial in many
subjects.., yes. But, a permanent effect on the thinking of society...
an emphatic yes. Yet, with all of his obvious attributes-many of
them mentioned here today-Justice Brennan was essentially a mod-
est man. When he was sworn into the Supreme Court as a member of
the court, he was quoted as remarking, "I feel like the mule at the
Kentucky Derby. I don't expect to distinguish myself, but I do expect
to benefit by the associations."2 It's impossible in the time we have to
mention all or even a substantial portion of the insightful opinions
written by Justice Brennan and the significant effect they've had on
1. 373 U.S. 546 (1963).
2. KiM I. EISLER, A JUSTICE FOR ALL: WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR. AND THE
DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA 99 (1993).
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the judicial process, but let me mention just a few.
Justice Brennan's opinion in Fay v. Noia3 was a scholarly and ef-
fective defense of habeas corpus and a firm denial of limitations on
the exercise of the great writ. Unfortunately, limitations on the ex-
ercise of the writ had developed in many state courts. Procedural
rules had placed restrictions on the exercise of the writ, despite the
lack of any such limitations enumerated in the Constitution. Justice
Brennan authored more than twenty-five majority opinions rejecting
arbitrary limitations on the use of the great writ. His opinion in Fay
v. Noia was a remarkable piece of scholarship. I don't know whether
any of these law clerks here today worked on it, but if they did I want
to commend them. His analysis, in effect, defined the role of the
great writ in our history, and for a time it stifled the numerous limi-
tations placed on the exercise of the writ, particularly in state courts.
I wish I could say that Faye v. Noia had a permanent effect. Unfor-
tunately, many state courts sadly, including ours in California, choose
to deny petitions for the writ on mere procedural grounds-the peti-
tion is late, it's repetitive, it's not in proper form. These and other
similar restrictions have frequently prevented writ petitions from
being heard on the merits. As a matter of fact, in 1996 Congress
passed a law that included "reform" of habeas corpus.4 How a consti-
tutional right can be reformed is a matter of mystery to me, and I'm
certain it would have been to Justice Brennan.
What I find almost unbelievable is the number of areas in the
law in which Justice Brennan had a significant impact. He is, of
course, widely known and, unfortunately, generally disregarded for
his considered opposition to the death penalty on Eighth Amend-
ment grounds. We came close to the Brennan views on capital pun-
ishment when Chief Justice Donald Wright of the California Su-
preme Court wrote in the Anderson opinion that the State, in putting
a person to death in the gas chamber, was violating, not the Eighth
Amendment, but our California Constitution. Wright pointed out
and made quite an effect of the fact that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, but our State Constitution
prohibits cruel or unusual punishment. And, on that basis, for a time
the death penalty was outlawed in California until the people, by ini-
tiative, decided otherwise. However, Justice Brennan persisted in his
3. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
4. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-132, 110 Stat. 1214.
5. People v. Anderson, 6 Cal. 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
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view on the death penalty and Thurgood Marshall consistently
agreed with him.' He never wavered in his belief that, just as it is
wrong for an individual to kill, it's equally wrong for the state to kill,
even in retaliation.
His effect, unfortunately, as I mentioned, has not been signifi-
cant in this area. Today there are more than 3000 men and women
on "death row" in the United States. California leads the nation, as
we do in so many other areas, with more than 450 occupants of our
"death row." I must confess that I would be relieved if some day in
the not too distant future, the Brennan/Marshall point of view would
prevail. As an aside, according to the Guiness Book of Records, the
first country to abolish the death penalty was Liechtenstein in 1789,
and that little nation seems to have survived ever since. So has
France, which has not had a public guillotine since June 17, 1939.
In a recent book on Justice Brennan, written by no less than
thirty authors, Derrick Bell discussed Brennan's opinions in the racial
area.7 He told of efforts to distinguish, even to discredit, Brennan's
views in this sensitive field. I liked the anecdote Bell used to suggest
that such efforts could not prevail. He told about the rights that
many white people need as well as black people. Brennan sought to
eliminate this fact in face of its rejection by so many whites who
feared the racial equality would somehow diminish rather than enrich
their lives. For these Derrick Bell told about a group of young
usurpers trying to humiliate a wise man, a wise elder, before a large
gathering of his followers. "Wise man," they called out, "use your
wisdom to tell us whether the bird we hold in our hands is alive or
dead." There is a prolonged silence. One youth tasted victory. If the
wise man claimed the bird was alive, they planned to crush it to
death. And if he said it was dead, they were going to let it loose so it
could fly away. So, they said, "Well, old man," they taunted him,
"tell us, if you can, is the bird alive or dead?" "The answer," the wise
man replied, "the answer is in your hands."'
Justice Brennan took giant steps to bring about equality of the
sexes in government, in the judiciary, and in the economic world. In
Frontiero v. Richardson9 in 1973, he maintained that women could
6. See, e.g., Sorola v. Texas, 493 U.S. 1005 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting
and Marshall, J., joining).
7. See Derrick Bell, Racial Realism in Retrospect, in REASON AND PASSION
199 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz, eds., 1997).
8. Id. at 206.
9. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
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not be arbitrarily eliminated from jury service. He wrote, "our
[n]ation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimina-
tion .... [S]uch discrimination was rationalized by an attitude of
'romantic paternalism' which, in practical effect, put women, not on a
pedestal, but in a cage."10
I find it interesting in sort of a bizarre way that, many years after
Swain v. Alabama," the Supreme Court persisted in holding that
there could be no limitation whatever on the right of attorneys to ex-
ercise peremptory challenges of prospective jurors. And here, I
think, is the value of the Brennan theory of state's rights or federal-
ism. Under Swain there could be no limitation on peremptory chal-
lenges. And I remember as a trial judge, I would try a criminal
case-there would be a black defendant, a white prosecutor, white
witnesses-and the prosecutor would challenge every black, or every
minority for that matter, who was put in the jury box. That defen-
dant would get a fair trial; I would make sure of that, but he would
never believe that he had a fair trial so long as every person of his
race was excluded from deciding the facts.
Well, Swain v. Alabama was the law for awhile until our court,
our State of California court, using the concept of federalism, decided
in the Wheeler a case that there could be no limitations on the use of
peremptory challenges, except if they were used for a racially dis-
criminatory purpose.3 As a matter of fact, we expanded the concept
to include, not only race, but any cognizable group, so that it would
include ethnicity, sex, race, religion, and so forth.' Thus in Wheeler
we decided, contrary to Swain, that there could be no challenges for
racially discriminatory purposes. Seven years later the United States
Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky 5 came around to our point of
view. That emphasizes to me the importance of the exercise of fed-
eralism by our states.
Justice Brennan consistently argued for equality in voting
rights.' He was very much opposed to the sixty-six and two thirds or
10. Id. at 684 (footnote omitted).
11. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
12. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,583 P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978).
13. See id. at 276-77, 583 P.2d at 761-62, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902-03.
14. See id. at 276, 583 P.2d at 761, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 902.
15. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
16. See United Jewish Orgs. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 168-78 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part); Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 643-58 (1966); see also Lani
Guinier & Pamela S. Karlan, The Majoritarian Difficulty: One Person, One Vote, in
REASON AND PASSION 207 (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz, eds., 1997)
(discussing Justice Brennan's evolutionary role in legislative reapportionment).
April 1998]
774 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:769
sixty percent requirement for the passage of bond issues. But, unfor-
tunately, most of the states still require that exorbitant vote in order
to authorize bond issues.
Some five centuries ago Ben Johnson wrote of the applause, de-
light and wonder of a person. Of course, he was referring to Shake-
speare, but I apply those same phrases to William Brennan. I under-
stand the applause, the approval, the delight, and his clear
composition and the wonder at his consistent devotion to principle.
The result is an enduring influence on the law and on our modem
society. From 1956 to 1990 William J. Brennan served on the Su-
preme Court, and in his opinions, his contribution to democracy, and
his personal characteristics as a judge and a warm human being he
became a role model for judges, lawyers, law students and scholars
throughout the land.
